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For much of its century long history, Nucor Corporation and its 
predecessors displayed turbulent financial performance.  Several attempts at a 
strategic realignment proved unsuccessful, and in 1965, the company faced 
insolvency.  Since that time, however, the company has rallied around its steel 
operations to become the largest steel producer in the United States, with $12.7 
billion in net annual sales.  This thesis examines Nucor’s development from an 
unprofitable conglomerate to a highly efficient enterprise.  Specific focus on the 
evolution of the activity system underlying the organization lays the groundwork 
for systematic analysis of why some companies succeed while others fail. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
OVERVIEW AND OBJECTIVES 
 
 This thesis uses a case study approach to analyze and understand the 
developmental processes that lead to organizational fit.  Organizational elements 
such as internal and external activities, structural elements, policies and 
resources are seen to form complex systems.  The notion of consistency, or 
internal fit, among an organization’s elements has long been accepted by 
academics as a major contributor to long-term success and that which forms the 
very essence of sustained competitive advantage.  However, little research exists 
about how organizations evolve toward these systems of tightly reinforcing 
elements.  While it may be evident that some elements are more central or core 
to an organization and others less essential, the ability to distinguish them 
systematically remains a dilemma. 
 To better comprehend the nature of core elements and the fundamental 
developmental processes that lead to true organizational fit, I chose to 
investigate the developmental route of Nucor Corporation, the largest steel 
producer in the U.S.  Historical data, existing literature, and broader conceptual 
reasoning about organizational evolution were used to assist in the identification 
of core elements and their interactions within the organizational system. 
 Nucor proved to be an excellent candidate for this study.   A history rich in 
complexity, prolific leadership and unique organizational structure all helped 
generate a plethora of secondary data and press coverage, thus, making it easier 
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to identify Nucor’s organizational system throughout its’ existence.  The analysis 
is divided into sections illustrating key inflection points in the Nucor’s history (See 
Table 1 below). 
 The objective has been to lay the groundwork on which future analysis 
can be based and provide a greater understanding of evolution toward strategic 
fit, and, perhaps even more importantly, the origins of misfit.  
 
Table 1. History of Nucor Corporation 
Timeline Description 
1954 – 1965 
 
 
1965 – 1966 
 
 
1966 – 1970 
 
1970 - 1986 
 
1986 – 1996 
 
1996 – 2006 
 
Operations as a mini-conglomerate, beginning with the 
formation of the Nuclear Corporation of America 
 
Streamlining of the business, and strategic realignment around 
the Vulcraft steel joists division 
 
Expansion in steel joists, and the introduction of minimills 
 
Rapid growth in steel production and fabrication 
 
Expansion of product line 
 
Nucor without Iverson, moving forward with new leadership 
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CHAPTER 2 
ACTIVITY SYSTEMS 
 Along with adding value and setting strategic agendas, creating 
competitive advantage is one of the most important aspirations of any 
ambitious firm.  Until recently years, many firms have been preoccupied with 
operational effectives (i.e. restructuring, improving efficiencies, etc.).  Though 
these improvements are certainly necessary, they are simply not enough.  All 
too often, even the greatest improvements begin to approach points of 
diminishing returns.  It is no longer enough to simply be efficient.  Firms need 
to be distinctive in the way in which they compete.   
 Competitive advantage almost never grows out of a single activity.   
“Unique” products or services are often easily imitated by competitors.  True 
sustainable advantage comes from systems of activities that are 
complementary.   As such, competitors no longer have to match just one 
thing, but rather a whole system if they wish to enjoy many of the same 
benefits.   Companies with sustainable competitive advantage integrate lots of 
activities within the business, all of which are consistent, interconnected and 
mutually reinforcing.  Interaction, or fit, also redoubles the imitation-deterring 
effects of imitation costs, limits on managerial capacity, and casual ambiguity.   
 In this thesis, I have used activity systems to help illustrate the value chain 
propositions throughout Nucor’s history.  The schematics categorize the generic 
value-adding activities for each period in Nucor’s history. The comparison of 
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activity systems from one period to the next help illustrate the actual 
development of the interaction of existing activities and the addition and 
assimilation of new ones.   
 The analysis describes the main activities that the organization performs 
and links them to the organization’s competitive position.    The illustration of core 
and supporting activities as well as their interaction, assist in the understanding 
of the evolution of fit, and ultimately the reasons behind some of the failures and 
the ultimate successes.   
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CHAPTER 3 
CONGLOMERATE OPERATIONS: 1954 – 1965 
 
Historical Overview 
Nucor Corporation has its origins in Reo Motor Works (Reo), a Lansing, 
MI, automobile producer founded by Ransom Olds in 1904.  Following sporadic 
profitability early in the century, the company abandoned automobile production 
in 1934, instead producing trucks for military contract.  Demand waned after 
World War II, and the company faced serious financial difficulty.1
In 1954, Reo liquidated all assets and began to distribute this money to 
shareholders.  A proxy battle ensued, and in 1955, shareholder TelAutograph 
Corporation won control of the company and forced it to acquire Nuclear 
Consultants, one of its subsidiaries.  The new company was named Nuclear 
Corporation of America (Nuclear).2
Nuclear sought to capitalize on emerging nuclear technology, but lacked 
clear direction in that endeavor.  Divisions varied from consulting operations, to 
instrument manufacturing, to chemical production.  In 1960, the company had not 
yet turned a profit, and the purchase of substantial stock interests by the Martin 
Company (later Martin Marietta) and Bear Stearns led to a reorganization of the 
Nuclear board of directors.3  The newly elected chairman, David A. Thomas, 
soon succeeded the company president. 
Thomas had a diverse business background, with experience in heavy 
equipment manufacturing, insulators, steel products, and radios.  From 1957 to 
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1960, he had served as corporate vice president at Radio Corporation of America 
(RCA).  With his broad background, Thomas found the concept of a 
conglomerate business appealing, and immediately embarked on a series of 
acquisitions and divestures.  Nuclear put its unprofitable Electron Tube and 
Isotope Specialties divisions up for sale, eventually divesting them at sizeable 
losses.4 Subsequent acquisitions were unrelated to the original nuclear 
technology strategy.  In 1961, Nuclear purchased U.S. Semiconductor, later 
renamed US Semcor.  A 1962 acquisition brought Valley Sheet Metal, a 
diversified steel products company with operations in air conditioning, ventilation, 
pipefitting, air purification, and sheet metal cutting.  In the same year, Nuclear 
acquired Vulcraft, a leading steel joist manufacturer. 
Although the company retained the “Nuclear” name, it did not maintain a 
focus on nuclear technologies as a guiding vision for the company.  In a symbolic 
move in 1962, Nuclear moved its headquarters from New Jersey, the location of 
the flagship Nuclear Division, to Phoenix, Arizona, home of the newly purchased 
US Semcor Division.5  Later acquisitions introduced yet more lines of business: 
equipment leasing and office copier equipment. 
In 1965, all divisions except Vulcraft were operating at a loss, and in May 
of that year, the Valley Sheet Metal Division defaulted on two bank loans.6 The 
Nuclear Corporation stood on the brink of bankruptcy. 
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The Vulcraft Acquisition
One bright point of Nuclear’s history was the 1962 acquisition of South 
Carolina-based Vulcraft, a manufacturer of steel joists.  Although Vulcraft had 
virtually no strategic fit with any of Nuclear’s other divisions, within a few years it 
would become the core of the organization.  Similarly, many of the activities that 
Vulcraft adopted during these early years as a subsidiary division would later 
resonate throughout Nucor Corporation. 
When Nuclear purchased Vulcraft in 1962, arguably the only link between 
the two organizations was Thomas’ brief prior experience in steel.  Vulcraft was a 
financially attractive target, however, a market leader in its segment with annual 
sales in excess of $6 million.7  Nuclear lacked any management with the 
experience to run the division, so 35-year-old outsider F. Kenneth Iverson was 
hired to oversee operations. 
Iverson’s management style had two primary goals: improving productivity 
and fostering strong employee relationships.  In both endeavors, Iverson seemed 
driven by a firm belief that all employees should be treated fairly.  His first order 
of business upon arriving in South Carolina was the desegregation of bathrooms 
and company events at Vulcraft.8  The decision was unpopular at the time, but 
set a standard for egalitarian principles that would continue at Nucor for decades. 
Iverson also instituted measures to care for his employees.  He formed a 
safety committee and began strict enforcement of safety rules in the plant.  
Accidents dramatically declined within one month.  In addition, late in 1962, he 
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introduced the Vulcraft Credit Association.  This was intended to tie employee 
well-being to company performance, serving both to enhance feelings of job 
security and to encourage productivity improvements in the plant.9
Aside from the direct productivity improvements associated with fewer 
injuries and heightened morale, the relationship Iverson fostered with his 
workforce helped him to combat a much greater threat to overall profitability: 
unionization.  The Teamsters attempted to organize Vulcraft in 1964, a move 
adamantly opposed by Iverson.  He wrote memos to employees emphasizing 
that job security lay with the company, not the unions, and he circulated anti-
Teamster literature.  In addition, he threatened to fire any employee organizing a 
union on the job.  Iverson pledged that any worker who went out on strike would 
immediately and permanently be replaced.  Iverson’s campaign was successful, 
and the workers voted down the union.10
Late in 1964, Iverson was recalled to headquarters and promoted to vice 
president.  In his two years at Vulcraft, he had installed a set of activities that had 
tripled earnings at the already profitable operation.11
A Fragmented Activity System  (Appendix A) 
 Vulcraft had built a foundation of supporting activities under Iverson’s 
management, but Nuclear Corporation itself had a largely fragmented activity 
system.  This seems almost inevitable considering its 1965 product line: radiation 
systems and instrumentation, rare earth oxides, semiconductors, equipment 
leasing, steel joists, air conditioning ducts, aerospace electronics, tin cans, and 
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plain-paper copiers, to name a few.12  There were, however, a few core activities 
serving as weak links in the activity system. 
 Technological innovation was a key driver of many of Nuclear’s business 
units.  The Nuclear Division in particular held some well-publicized technology 
and process patents during its history.13  The Research Chemicals, US Semcor, 
and Electromechanical Divisions also had a technology focus.  During this time 
period, technology played a far lesser role in the steel and equipment leasing 
divisions.  However, a commitment to technology was to remain a lasting part of 
the Nucor activity system long after the divestiture of the high technology 
divisions. 
 Nuclear also dealt largely in highly specialized products.  That 
specialization was often manifested in the form of technological expertise, as 
discussed above.  However, a number of Nuclear’s products were also made-to-
order, specially tailored to customer needs.  Vulcraft manufactured products 
almost exclusively on a made-to-order basis.  The Nuclear Division also custom 
tailored the majority of its products.  Another form of specialization dealt with 
segmentation, where Nuclear Corp. produced products that appealed only to  
specific segments.  An example here is the Research Chemicals Division, whose 
rare earth oxides had primary application in high-end color television screens,14 
or US Semcor, who marketed its products directly to the US government.15
 Finally, a very loose link among the Vulcraft, Southern Leasing, and Valley 
Sheet Metal is the capital-intensive nature of the businesses.  Beyond this, 
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however, there is little relationship between Southern Leasing, Valley Sheet 
Metal, and rest of Nuclear. 
 Aside from these general connections, there were few supporting activities 
within Nuclear.  For example, Vulcraft was highly efficient and cost-sensitive, yet 
at the corporate level, the board frequently flew around the country in a private 
plane.  The low degree of activity consistency likely contributed to the company’s 
financial difficulties. 
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CHAPTER 4 
STREAMLINING: 1965 – 1966 
Historical Overview
 Despite the financial distress at Nuclear Corporation, there was no sign 
that the board intended to change top management.  Fears of insolvency led to a 
massive shareholder sell-off, with Martin Marietta Company selling its 22% stake 
at $0.05 per share.  The stock had been trading at $1.60 per share.  Donald Lillis, 
a director at Bear Stearns and a 2% owner of Nuclear, was the acquirer.   Lillis 
convened a special board meeting, where David Thomas resigned with the 
unanimous approval of the board.  Lillis was elected the new chairman. 
 Within two months, five additional board members were asked to leave the 
company.  Lillis solved the immediate financial crisis by personally loaning the 
company $250,000 and establishing a $3.85 million revolving credit line with 
Southeastern Financial Corporation.  $3.2 million of the line was required to pay 
down existing debts.16  The board elected Ken Iverson as president in August of 
1965, by a majority vote.17  Iverson quickly promoted three other managers from 
the Vulcraft divisions to vice president.  
 After the top-level turnover, the conglomerate strategy of the first half of 
the decade disappeared.  Valley Sheet Metal, the company’s biggest cash drain, 
immediately went up for sale.  Within a short time, Nuclear also divested its 
Electromechanical Division, Southern Leasing, and US Semcor.  The 
reorganized company consisted of four divisions: Vulcraft (South Carolina), 
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Vulcraft (Nebraska), Nuclear Division, and Research Chemicals.  The focus of 
the company was the profitable steel joist operations.18
 With only the Research Chemical division remaining in Phoenix, it made 
little sense to keep the corporate headquarters there.  In 1966, Iverson and his 
Vice President of Finance, Sam Siegel, moved the corporate offices to Charlotte, 
North Carolina, in order to be closer to the Vulcraft operations.19
Positioning in Steel Products
 Although significant competition arose from other steel joist specialty 
shops, the primary source of competitive pressure came from integrated steel 
mills, such as Bethlehem Steel and US Steel.  There are two key differences in 
product offering between integrated mills and shops such as Vulcraft (Figure 1).  
  Figure 1. 1966 Vulcraft Competitive Positioning: Steel Products 
 
High Margin Product Mix 
Product 
Specialization 
Steel    
jjjjoist    
production Product 
Breadth 
Vul-
craft 
Low Margin Product Mix 
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 First, while Vulcraft offered only one product (steel joists), integrated mills 
offered a full line of steel products.  Second, different products have different 
margins, largely dependent on the quality of steel and degree of processing 
required.  Joists were relatively low margin steel items, when compared to top-
end products such as steel plate.  Integrated mills sold these low margin 
products, since they serviced all segments of the steel market; however, their 
primary focus was on higher end steel products. 
Value Creation in Steel Joists
 Although Vulcraft manufactured joists to customer specifications, steel 
products remained largely a commodity product, and competitive pricing was 
critical for success in the industry.  The competitive price point was reasonably 
close to costs, making joists a relatively low margin steel product.  With price 
effectively fixed, a firm needed to push down costs in order to increase 
appropriated value.  Because Vulcraft purchased raw steel rather than producing 
it, the company had little control over supply costs.  However, the company’s 
emphasis on productivity granted Vulcraft some advantages in operational costs 
(Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Vulcraft Value Creation and Appropriation 
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A sound safety policy and strong employee relationships generated 
productivity advantages.  In addition, in 1965 Iverson initiated an incentive 
program for senior management based on productivity, entirely eliminating 
discretionary bonuses.  Iverson eventually extended this type of incentive 
program to all employees.  With workers knowing exactly what their efforts would 
net them, Vulcraft enjoyed worker productivity far above the industry norm.  One 
Nucor executive later said of the practice, “We hire five, work them like ten, and 
pay them like eight.”20
 Vulcraft’s non-union status was critical in implementing this compensation 
structure.  The company’s unionized competitors would find this approach to 
labor difficult or impossible to imitate, giving Vulcraft a sustainable advantage 
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over its integrated competitors.  With its low cost position, Vulcraft was able to 
gain market share while successfully maintaining profitability. 
Thinning and Patching in the Activity System (Appendix B) 
 Once in control of the company, Iverson applied the Vulcraft management 
model to the entire Nuclear Corporation.  This had a massive impact on the 
Nuclear’s activity system, and dramatically improved strategic fit within the 
company.  With most non-core businesses divested, “Capital Intensive 
Businesses” no longer appears in the activity system (although Vulcraft is capital 
intensive, this is not a guiding directive of the organization, and is no longer 
needed to tie together the loosely related divisions of the 1965 activity system).  
Three new core activities have been added to the activity system, as the 
organization begins to more closely resemble Vulcraft: low cost structure, strong 
employee relations, and high quality in segment. 
 Low cost focus was a primary feature at Nuclear by 1966.  Unlike the 
somewhat wasteful corporate culture under Thomas, Iverson operated a bare 
bones corporate office.  When the company headquarters moved to Charlotte in 
January of 1966, the entire corporate staff quit, rather than follow the company 
cross-country.  No staff member was replaced before spring, and even then, the 
staff was kept to a minimum.  The headquarters itself consisted of a rented office 
of only 2,000 square feet.21  Nuclear sought not only to reduce staff members, 
but also to minimize bureaucracy in the organization.  The entire company had  
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only four layers of management.22  Responsibility was pushed to the lowest level 
possible, creating a highly flexible organization.   
Performance based compensation structures helped to ensure that these 
managers would make the decisions in the best interests of the company.  These 
incentives were also instrumental in maintaining a high commitment to quality.  
This emphasis on quality would increase as Nuclear’s activity system continued 
to evolve. 
  Nuclear also inherited Vulcraft’s focus on using egalitarian principles to 
produce strong relationships with employees.  Under Iverson, all employees in 
the company had the same benefits, from the CEO to steel shop workers.  
Everyone in the company had the same holidays, the same amount of vacation 
time, and the same health plan.  Iverson sought to remove status symbols from 
all levels of the organization.  He mandated that all workers wear the same color 
hard hat, with the exception of visitors and safety personnel.  This was unusual in 
the steel industry, as foremen had traditionally worn a different colored hat as a 
symbol of rank.23
 The Research Chemical and Nuclear Divisions remained only loosely tied 
to the company’s activity system, and as a result of these operations Nuclear 
Corporation continued to lose money.  However, Iverson’s reorganization had 
greatly improved the strategic fit among Nuclear’s activities, and profitability was 
improving.  Nuclear now had a solid base for growth.  
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CHAPTER 5 
EXPANSION:  1966-1967 
Historical Overview 
 
 1966 marked the beginning of the rebuilding of Nuclear Corporation of 
America.  Ken Iverson’s philosophy called for the empowerment of general plant 
managers, who enjoyed nearly autonomous responsibility.  Bi-annual meetings 
were held in order to allow managers to voice their opinions and concerns, in 
which Iverson himself acted simply as a participant.  The firm hired extensively 
and set in place the administrative infrastructure that would serve it well for 
several decades.  This was an especially frenetic period in the firm’s history, yet 
was formative due to the fact that “Everybody was just so enthused in getting 
things going.”24
 Having shed the subsidiaries that were not clearly aligned with long-term 
strategic goals, Nuclear saw the need to expand its presence in those areas 
where core lines of business were identified.  Through commitment to these 
units, the firm developed more clarity in its strategy as a whole, allowing it to 
accentuate the appropriate points in its operations. 
Expansion, Value Creation in Steel Joists
 Throughout the 1960s, the steel joist business was characterized by fierce 
competition between a large host of producers for a market composed of a small 
number of buyers.  The bundle of product and services offered by the 
aforementioned producers was similar and thus, the value added of each 
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producer was, in essence, zero.  The limited number of buyers appropriated the 
maximum amount of value in such a situation.  Nuclear dealt with this 
predicament on several fronts – by expanding its operations, stringently 
controlling costs and offering a host of services to increase customer loyalty.  By 
1967, with its streamlined focus and distinctive production incentive programs, 
Nuclear was the leading joist manufacturer in the United States, having captured 
25% of the market.25
 The firm’s strategy was straightforward – provide a good product, offer the 
best price, and market aggressively.  From its very inception, Nuclear had 
focused on quality, and emphasized its design flexibility and customer service.  
Each of the Vulcraft plants maintained their own engineering departments, which 
were computerized to help generate customized designs for customers’ specific 
demands.   
 In the interest of controlling costs, the firm introduced its own fleet of 
trucks to guarantee on-time delivery to all 50 states.  By taking control of 
shipping, Nuclear generated loyalty from its contractors, who did not have to 
concern themselves with idle workers or long waits for commercial carriers to 
arrive.26  Joist plants were also located in rural areas, near the markets they 
served.   
 The offering of such services worked to raise customer willingness-to-pay 
by a small but not insignificant margin, thereby further increasing the value 
appropriable by Nuclear.  By such initiatives, the firm posted net earnings of 
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$755,440 in 1966, up from $114,777 the year before, while sales dropped from 
$10.94 million to $10.5 million.  Working capital had increased to $43 million, and 
shareholders’ equity tripled to $2.2 million. (Data taken from the company filings.)  
 Nuclear cemented its strategic plan of being able to “profitably ship joists 
to every state in the union”27 by purchasing the M&S Steel Company in April 
1967, further increasing its joist production capacity by 25%.  Even the less 
successful divisions posted increased sales.   
Porter’s 5 Forces Analysis (Appendix B) 
 Supplier power was significant due to the fact that the firms in the steel 
industry at the time were largely dependent on imported steel.  The foreign firms 
in question acted more as price setters than price takers.  Minimills had not been 
implemented at this time and thus the steel firms were in a constrictive position.  
Unions were common at most of the Big Steel firms and represented a powerful 
community of lobbyists for change.  Nuclear would not face significant union-
related challenges for a short period of time.  Thus, supplier power in the industry 
at this point was considerable. 
 Threat of substitutes was not significant due to the fact that there were no 
viable substitutes for the use of steel in, for example, the automotive industry.   
 Buyer power remained intense as the concentration of buyers was very 
limited as compared to that of producers.  Furthermore, it was extremely difficult 
to “lock in” buyers, as they had low switching costs due to the fact that steel was 
a commodity product.  Buyers were in a position to demand prices of the 
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producers, further contributing to the limitations of the margins within which the 
steel industry operated.   
 Barriers to entry were significant due to the fact that a considerable capital 
investment was needed in order to operate on the requisite scale for profitability 
and reasonably low costs.  The former was already slim in comparison to many 
other industries and the latter was, logically, necessary to maintain it due to the 
price sensitivity of buyers.  Furthermore, this was a difficult industry to exit, which 
is another key consideration for any group considering entering a new industry.  
Differentiation was also difficult and may only have been possible by the building 
of efficient service infrastructure, another deterrent to entry.  Overall, there were 
significant barriers to entry.   
 Degree of rivalry within the majority of the industry was considerable due 
to little differentiation and firms scrambling to appropriate value.  However, 
Nuclear had carved out a niche for itself and did not face significant retaliatory 
actions by its immediate competitors as it expanded its core businesses.  Once 
again, though, rivalry was most often driven by low product differentiation, low 
brand identity, low switching costs, and high exit barriers.  Thus, rivalry was 
significant, but manageable in the given situation. 
 Overall, the industry was not entirely attractive to an outsider, but Nucor’s 
distinctive characteristics that formed the central nodes in its activity system 
placed it in a position with potential to play a dominant role in the industry. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SUPPLY MANAGEMENT:  1967-1969 
 
Historical Overview
 
 One of the clearest hallmarks of Nuclear’s success was that the firm 
was not prepared to rest on its laurels.  Even while it was prospering, Iverson 
realized that Nuclear could be even more profitable if it would manufacture its 
own steel.  “Iverson, a trained metallurgist, had never gotten the love of steel-
making out of his blood, and he believed that the company could save money by 
supplying its own steel for its joist operations.”28
 In late 1966, Iverson asked the board of directors to consider 
constructing an electric furnace steel mill similar in design to those that were 
already in operation in Europe.  Known as a minimill, with a capacity of 60,000 
tons per year, the facility would be smaller and more economical than the larger 
mills used by the majority of Nuclear’s competitors.29  The board enthusiastically 
welcomed the suggestions and approved the plan to establish the Eastern 
Carolina Steel Division that would make steel angles and rounds to be used at 
Vulcraft facilities, though it was an enormous gamble for a firm that had just 
returned to profitability.   
The Birth of the Minimill  
 In 1967, 60% of each revenue dollar Vulcraft earned was spent on 
materials, primarily steel.  Approximately 60% of the steel used by Vulcraft’s 
operations was imported, and since 1963, the price of foreign steel had ranged 
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from $104.40 to $121.80 per ton. Thus it is clear why Iverson would want Nuclear 
to minimize its dependency on foreign imports – in the words of Rod Hernandez, 
his colleague, “They were really at the mercy of foreign steel.”30  The situation 
was very constrictive for Nuclear due to the fact that the firm had to buy several 
months in advance, which led to the market functioning sub-optimally.  Prices on 
finished goods could plummet, causing havoc due to the fact that the firm still 
had commitments to fulfill on existing orders.   
 Iverson was confident that Nuclear could take advantage of the cost 
differential between buying steel on the open market and producing it 
themselves.  The benefits of minimills were clear – they were rather inexpensive 
to build and operate, were energy-efficient, could operate on scrap alone, could 
be built to efficiently produce relatively small quantities of metals, could produce 
high-quality steel in batches, and small batches of specific types.31  Thus, even 
with low throughput, these facilities could be efficient.  By building the proposed 
minimill, the joist plants would be assured of a continuing and economical supply 
of steel for their raw materials needs, and the mill would have a captive market 
within which it could operate profitably. 
 In July 1968, Nuclear formally announced the construction of the 
Darlington minimill amid fanfare and media coverage, thereby signaling its 
commitment to the operation.  Net sales for 1968 exceeded $35.5 million and net 
earnings $2.3 million.32
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Grappling with Unions
 In the eventful late 60s, Nuclear also faced a resurgence of a 
predicament that had plagued the steel industry for decades – that of organized 
labor.  In January 1968, employees at Nuclear’s M&S Steel Division in Alabama 
were recruited by members of two local unions – the Ironworkers International 
Union and Shopmen’s Local 539.  The General Manager of the plant, H.M. 
Crapse, wrote to each employee, imploring them to think twice about the 
detriment to the company as a result of unionization.  Nuclear took a hard stance 
and issued, “No union has the right to run M&S Steel Division and tell us what we 
have to do.  We will never have to bow down to any demand which is unsound 
and unreasonable.”33  
 The situation continued to grow more complex as the National Labor 
Relations Board was called in to assess the validity of union elections and 
specific employee terminations carried out by Nuclear.  However, by July 1969, 
the firm emerged as the winner and the issue of unions was eliminated.  As 
Iverson told The Wall Street Journal in 198134, unionization efforts had proved to 
be unsuccessful because even the most lucrative basic steel agreement with a 
union could not match Nuclear’s combination of wages and job security. 
 Another factor in coercing workers to stand by the status quo was 
Nuclear’s egalitarian management structure and policies, and its extensive 
incentive systems.  While the actual work involved at the facilities was difficult 
and dirty and the pace challenging, once a worker made it through his/her first 
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year of employment, turnover fell to almost zero.  Part of Nuclear’s strategy was 
to actively solicit and implement suggestions from these workers.  Even if a 
concept was unproven, Nuclear would often try it on an experimental basis.   
Activity System (Appendix C) 
 There were no dramatic shifts in the activity system during these 
periods, but rather an accentuation of the firm’s central activities.  Nuclear had 
become more entrenched in Vulcraft operations, had clarified its labor policies 
and had become even more dedicated to technological leadership.   
 Nuclear’s success was best emphasized by its comparison to the 
struggles of Big Steel.  Iverson attributed the industry’s predicament to its 
reliance on top-heavy management that was reluctant to change and take risks: 
“The Big Steel companies tend to resist new technologies as long as they can.  
They only accept a new technology when they need it to survive.”  Thus, Nuclear 
was in a strong position to take on Big Steel, its largest competitors.   
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CHAPTER 7 
THE MINIMILL ERA 1970-1986 
 
Historical Overview
 
Following operational and managerial upheaval in the 1960’s, Nuclear 
embraced the 1970’s with the objective of rebuilding the firm around its major 
profitable operations. Management directed its energies toward two basic 
businesses - the steel joist business, operated as Vulcraft, and the steel 
business, operated as Nucor Steel. 1972 was a major inflection point for the 
evolution of Nucor as a profitable steel business. Management explicitly 
communicated that the firm’s core competencies were progressing towards steel 
production. Effective on January 1st 1972, the company name changed to Nucor. 
Iverson stated: “We feel that Nucor Corporation, our new name, not only is 
simpler but also more accurately reflects the nature of our business today, since 
the nuclear end of it accounts for less than 5% of our sales35.” Iverson’s words 
were symbolic of two strategies that he would continue to pursue with: no-frills 
and a focus on core competencies.  In July that year, Nucor was also listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange and entered the ranks of the Fortune 1000.36 This 
signaled to the market that Nucor was a rapidly growing firm with high earnings 
potential.  
Nucor was certainly an enviable position due to its adoption of minimill 
technology. It could now produce cost-competitive molten steel from scrap at 
one-tenth the scale required for an integrated mill. This translated to capital 
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expenditures which were also about one-tenth of that required for integrated mills 
such as US Steel and Bethlehem.  Furthermore, the average minimill offered an 
operational cost advantage that was 15% lower than that of integrated steel 
manufacturers. Internal and external industry developments through the 
seventies also enabled Nucor to thicken its activity system around its core 
businesses, thus laying the foundation for its long-term strategic fit. 
In the late sixties and early seventies, the steel industry celebrated a brief 
surge in demand. As a result, integrated companies began expanding their plant 
operations. Although these new facilities had a greater capacity, their operational 
costs were high. The integrated companies could only justify such a large 
investment by incremental investments in blast furnaces, continuous casters and 
modern rolling mills. The mounting pressure from unions, together with their large 
capital expenditures, forced large steelmakers to gradually increase their prices. 
Between 1969 and 1976, listed prices jumped 106% from $165 per ton to $339 
per ton.37 Since Nucor, unlike integrated steelmakers, was sourcing cheap scrap 
metal for its minimill process, it could focus on its low cost structure to be 
competitive in such a commoditized industry. Its low-cost emphasis 
complemented the firm’s technological savvy well. Nucor had developed an 
electric furnace that represented the very latest in steelmaking technology, and 
Iverson’s objective was to replicate the success of Nucor’s highly productive 
Darlington minimill.38
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Therefore, Nucor’s path from 1970 through 1986 was characterized by 
rapid organic growth and capacity maximization. The backward integration into 
minimill technology that began in Darlington - to control Vulcraft’s supply costs – 
evolved into an extremely profitable business for Nucor. Nucor was recognized 
by the press as a pioneer in the specialized steel sector, and Iverson in particular 
was acknowledged as an authority on issues concerning the U.S. steel industry. 
Although steel imports posed a threat during this period, Iverson and Nucor 
proved to the U.S. market that high quality steel could be produced at 
competitive costs.  
New Minimill Ventures 1970-1986  (Table 2) 
Soon after Nucor’s name change and NYSE listing, Iverson announced 
his intention to expand the company’s steelmaking facilities. In August 1972, the 
company announced the construction of its second minimill in Norfolk, Nebraska. 
It was modeled on the Darlington mill, and would produce steel exclusively from 
scrap metal, except that its capacity was significantly higher at 160,000 tons per 
year. In 1974, the construction of the third minimill in Texas was underway. Like 
the other two minimills, the Jewett mill was near Nucor’s joist operations, which 
maximized the efficiency and timeliness of product delivery. The next minimill 
(400,000 tons/yr) was built in 1981 in Plymouth Texas, which enabled the 
company to penetrate the western regional market as well as supply its Vulcraft 
division.  
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                     Table 2.  Summary of Nucor’s New Ventures 1968-1983    
     
     
Minimills  Products Year  Initial 
Capacity 
Nearby 
 
Joist Plants 
Darlington, S. 
Carolina 
steel bars 1968 120k/yr Florence, SC 
* Norfolk, Nebraska steel angles 1972 160k/yr Stanton, 
Nebraska 
* Jewett, Texas steel rods, angles 1974 200k/yr Grapeland, 
Texas 
* Plymouth, Utah steel shapes 1981 400k/yr Plymouth, Utah 
     
Other     
* Brigham, Utah grinding balls 1983  Plymouth, Utah 
     
Nucor was simultaneously expanding its steel joist business, and the fifth 
joist plant was opened in St. Joe, Indiana in 1972. Nucor emerged as a pioneer 
in this segment by launching the first of its kind advertising campaign to promote 
high-quality, reliable and low-cost joists. No other joist manufacturers had 
advertised in the past. A representative of Price-McNabb (Nucor’s advertisement 
agency) said, “We advertise how Vulcraft has its own trucks, which was unusual 
at the time. So we advertised about our ability to deliver.”39 Nucor’s strategy of 
rapid organic growth had in fact brought Nucor closer to its customers – the 
minimills were in close proximity to the Vulcraft operations and Vulcraft in turn 
was doing everything in its power to ensure speedy delivery of its products. In 
addition, Nucor had carved a spot in every geographical market in the United 
States by the early 1982. The Northeast and Southeast regions were supplied by 
the Darlington plant; the Midwest was covered by Nebraska, the Southwest and 
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Southeast by Norfolk, and the Western region by Plymouth. Iverson was aware 
of the price-sensitive nature of the commoditized steel industry. Nucor wanted to 
ensure that customer value did not decrease in the event of fluctuating prices, so 
their competent distribution increased the customers’ willingness to pay. This 
enabled Nucor to increase its prices when the price of scrap metal increased, yet 
still retain its customer base. Nucor did increase the price of its merchant bar 
products in 1976 from $10 to $20 per ton.40 Even though Nucor usually priced 
below domestic and foreign suppliers, their superior delivery encouraged 
customer loyalty. 
            Figure 3. 1986 Nucor Value Creation and Appropriation 
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 Nucor also gradually increased its appropriated value by keeping an 
extremely low cost structure throughout its expansion. The firm gained great 
benefits due to its emphasis on building mills economically and running them 
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efficiently. Nucor built its own continuous casters, reheat furnaces and cooling 
beds. It was often referred to as a “small electric furnace shop.41 Due to its 
decentralized organizational structure, regional managers were responsible for 
the entire life cycle of a minimill. Therefore, the same person who supervised the 
construction of a plant was responsible for overseeing its expansion and efficient 
operation. . For example, by 1981, it only took Nucor one year to build and set-up 
the Plymouth plant, while their competitors ordinarily needed twice that time.42 
Furthermore, obsolescence was not a problem, and facilities were monitored and 
revamped cost-effectively every four years. In the late seventies, Nucor 
embarked on a major expansion program of its Florence and Norfolk plants. 
These actions are indicative of Iverson’s preoccupation with the most efficient 
technologies and processes.  
Porter’s Five Forces Analysis 
 The five forces framework underwent significant changes from 1972-1985 
as Nucor embarked on its new ventures. Nucor revolutionized the steel industry 
and was appropriating value through its efficient operational processes. The 
arrival of disruptive minimill technology has had a significant impact on the 
players in the industry.    
Supplier power decreased after the arrival of minimills, as traditional 
industry suppliers – ore, energy, transportation – underwent change. Firstly, the 
majority of ore supply was replaced by a need for large quantities of scrap metal. 
This was at the very heart of Nucor’s cost-efficiency, and initially low scrap prices 
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allowed it to appropriate more value relative to non-minimill competitors. 
Secondly, minimills consume far less power than their integrated counterparts, 
which certainly drove down Nucor’s fixed costs. The smaller scale and relatively 
low output of minimills allowed them to be built much closer to their customer 
bases, which Nucor did. Therefore, transportation and logistics costs decreased 
significantly. Since suppliers primarily used trucks (commodities) as opposed to 
railroads, the supplier power decreased in this area. 
Threat of substitutes was still not significant, apart from the emerging 
trend that the automotive industry (historically the largest consumer of steel) was 
using lighter plastic parts for cars. These substitutes only affected the peripheral 
steel segments.    
Buyer Power was unchanged on an individual basis. However, due to 
Nucor’s later entry into higher margin products, it successfully increased the 
quantity and nature of customers it served. This enabled Nucor to diversify the 
risk of volatile demand. For example, the market for cold-finished steel did not 
fluctuate as the other markets did. By the early 1980’s, Nucor began serving a 
range of equipment manufacturers, which offered a stable customer base.43    
Barriers to entry were still quite high due to the large capital expenditures 
in the industry. For integrated steel mills, the barriers to entry for lower margin 
products entirely excluded them from the industry. Their cost structure prevented 
them being able to compete with the minimills. On several occasions in the 
seventies, they were forced to price particular products below their cost to 
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compete against foreign steel and local minimills. Minimills were in a far better 
position to enter specialized markets, however companies such as Nucor were 
far better poised due to immense economies of scale. Since the government had 
become stringent with pollution control and safety standards, only companies 
with enough capital and expertise would enter the industry with ease.  
The degree of rivalry mounted due to strong foreign competition. Nucor 
followed a pricing strategy which matched the market’s lowest price. As a result, 
Nucor never priced below cost and foreign competitors significantly reduced 
Nucor’s margins. Foreign imports increased from 12.4% of domestic supply in 
1973, to over 20% of domestic supply in 1977.44 Foreign competition bypassed 
expensive investments in basic open furnaces, finding more cost-effective ways 
to produce steel. The government rarely took an interventionist approach to 
protecting the steel industry – apart from the Trigger Pricing introduced by 
Carter’s administration. Nucor was so cost-efficient and proactive in the industry, 
that it actually condemned protectionism and accused it of stunting technological 
innovation. 
Therefore, Nucor was able to strengthen itself in the industry due its 
operational efficiencies and innovative technology. To understand how minimills 
were disruptive, the following section will elaborate on Nucor’s product expansion 
and repositioning. 
 
Repositioning: Minimills as Disruptive Technology 
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Until 1974, Nucor’s primary customer was itself – the Vulcraft steel joists 
business. However in 1974, the Jewett minimill in Texas provided enough 
capacity to allow Nucor to solicit steel orders from large outside customers. The 
firm’s initial focus on low-margin specialized products (joists) eventually 
broadened to higher margin markets. As the minimill production process and the 
quality of steel products improved, Nucor was able to integrate into markets that 
it initially had no scope of capturing. Minimills were disruptive because they were 
initially considered as inferior by integrated steel producers, as they failed to 
meet the demands of mainstream customers.45
By 1975, Nucor began increasing its production of merchant-quality bars 
and small structural pieces, which marked its foray into high margin markets. It 
was able to match the prices of Japanese, Chinese and South American 
importers, and took full advantage of the transient surge in demand. Nucor’s 
market penetration had increased its sales by 167% from 1974 to 1979. In 1979, 
Nucor entered the cold-finish segment (for machine precision parts) by starting 
two 80,000-ton facilities in Norfolk and Darlington. By 1982, Nucor produced 70% 
of its steel for outside customers (as opposed to 15% in 1975). The company 
embarked on an ambitious five-year product expansion, with plans to produce a 
wider range of grades and sizes of angles, rounds, channels, flats, forging billets 
and special small shapes. Nucor’s acquisition of the grinding balls business in 
Utah (1983) also increased its product range.  Nucor’s relative industry 
positioning in 1986 is illustrated below.  
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The dynamics of the steel industry are also what enabled Nucor to begin 
integrating its product range. The domestic steel industry was historically 
composed of two vertically integrated sectors – raw steel production and finishing 
mills. 
     Figure 4. 1986 Nurcor Competitive Positioning: Steel Products 
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 Raw steel products (standard steel shapes) were usually produced from 
ore and coke and sent to finishing mills which conducted various heat treating 
and shaping processes to produce structural shapes. These two distinct sectors 
were usually housed under a single facility, but as two different operations. The 
onset of continuous casting technologies in the late 1970s has blurred this 
classical demarcation, as isometric shapes can now be produced in a single 
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operation. Continuous casting only serves the mid-margin markets, which 
explains how Nucor succeeded as a disruptive technology. 
Nucor’s Crown Jewel: Employee Relations  
 Woven persistently through Nucor’s success story is Iverson’s unique 
brain-child: his egalitarian, incentive-based worker-relation philosophy. It comes 
as no surprise that from 1965 to 1975, the number of Nucor employees had 
increased from 1,500 to 23,000.46 Iverson rarely fired his workers, and they 
seemed to seldom quit their jobs. A number of developments in this domain have 
thickened this node of the activity system.  
 Iverson loved to reward all Nucor stakeholders with cash. Whether they 
were minority shareholders or steel workers, Iverson simply dished out cash 
when times were good. This was apparent in 1973 when a cash dividend of 5 
cents per share was awarded to shareholders, just one year after Nucor’s 
common shares were listed on the NYSE. He rewarded loyal workers tangibly, 
and in 1978 contributed ten percent of Nucor’s earnings towards an employee 
profit sharing scheme and paid each worker $500.47  
 Consistent with his strong opposition to unions, Iverson did not want high 
workforce turnover, and implemented systems which encouraged workers to 
build a career with Nucor. In 1974, The Nucor Foundation was formed in 
response to a fatal accident which killed four men in the Darlington mill. The 
foundation formed a scholarship fund which aimed to send all employee children 
to university. Unlike other companies, this program was equally available to 
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management and floor workers. The egalitarianism that characterized Nucor was 
unheard of in other Steel companies. It was practiced to the extent that workers 
“shared the pain” during the recession of 1984, and all worked four day 
workweeks. Not a single worker was fired at Nucor, unlike at integrated mills like 
Bethlehem and US Steel. Each worker shared in company’s losses as opposed 
to being retrenched.  
 Iverson’s brilliant philosophy defined the most crucial factor in the steel 
industry: worker productivity. Worker productivity is measured by the number of 
labor hours per ton. During the seventies and eighties, Nucor achieved worker 
productivity of four labor hours per ton compared with the national average of 
eight per ton.48 Even foreign competitors were capable of just six labor hours per 
ton. Ironically, Nucor was widely known in the industry as one of the highest 
paying steel employers. It seemed that that the worker incentives, egalitarianism 
and the non-unionized nature of the workforce were a great strategic fit for 
Nucor.   
Thickening of the Activity System (Appendix D) 
Iverson’s approach on keeping things simple did wonders for the firm and 
its stakeholders from 1970 to 1986. Nucor’s flat hierarchical, decentralized 
structure was successful in its autonomous operations. As early as 1972, Iverson 
said, “We are very confident that it’s going to be a very fine business for those 
people who are efficient, low-cost producers”.49 He continued to thicken the 
major nodes of Nucor’s activity system, using Nucor’s early footing in minimill 
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technology as a ‘trigger’. The disruptive nature of minimills allowed Iverson to 
pursue an extremely low-cost strategy with respect to the construction, 
production and operation of these facilities. During this era of maximum capacity 
and organic growth, Nucor realized incredible economies of learning and scale. It 
managed to position itself in every geographical market in the United States, 
bringing its products closer to the customers, thus increasing the total value in 
the industry.   
To some degree, there was some patching and thickening in the activity 
system with respect to the range of products offered. While Vulcraft was known 
as a high-quality specialized product, many of the steel shapes that the minimills 
produced were medium quality lower-margin products. Therefore, medium quality 
product development also strengthened as a core activity for the mini-minimills. 
They did, however remain highly specialized, and by the mid-1980’s, broadened 
their range of specialized products to include a variety of shapes and grades. 
The integrated steel-makers had already ceded their position in lower margin 
markets to efficient minimill producers and foreign competitors.   
Another primary activity that evolved was Nucor’s worker relations. The 
founding of the Nucor Foundation and the profit sharing contributions expressed 
Iverson’s interest in long-term employment and workforce commitment. Nucor’s 
reputation for providing tangible rewards to the firm’s stakeholders could never 
have been have been stronger. Nucor issued a cash dividend to shareholders 
just one year after going public, and paid lump-sum cash bonuses to its 
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employees at the year-end if times were good. Other firms talked, while Nucor 
performed. Nucor’s investment in cutting-edge technology was of course another 
activity that flourished. Nucor’s new plants were among the most efficient in the 
world in terms of labor productivity and environmental control. They conserved 
energy and controlled emission of pollutants and dusts. It really was notable that 
Nucor could price below foreign imports, while having the best technology in the 
market and the most stable workforce. It seemed that Nucor was evolving 
towards a perfect fit by thickening most of its rudimentary activities uniformly 
during this era. 
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CHAPTER 8 
EXPANSION AND INVESTMENT: 1986-1996 
 
Historical Overview 
The next decade was one of continuous growth for Nucor, marked by 
expansion into different products and the construction of several new mills.  The 
steel industry had rebounded from the slump in the early ‘80s, and in 1985 sales 
and net earnings had climbed to $758.4 million and $58.4 million, compared to 
$486 million and $22.2 million in 1982.50  Several firms had exited the steel 
industry during the recession, which caused industry-wide losses of $6 billion and 
created a one-third unemployment rate among steel workers.  Nucor had 
preserved profitability and managed to retain its entire workforce by using a 
reduced workweek, and found itself in a position to expand its market share to 
take up the slack.   
However, competition was growing both domestically, in the form of other 
minimills (by 1985 there were close to 50 in operation, of which Nucor owned 
four), and from imports, whose volume had grown rapidly.  Domestic minimills 
were using the same basic technology centered on the EAF (Electric Arc 
Furnace) to achieve similar cost advantages and were competing in the same 
market segments.  In 1984, imports reached 26.2 million tons, a market-share 
height of 26.4% of the 98.9 million tons consumed in the United States.51  In 
August of the same year, Nucor chose to drop its prices by $15 per ton on 
average in order to offset this trend.  Integrated steel no longer considered Nucor 
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a direct threat at this juncture, choosing to drop out of rebar, rod, and bar 
production, where gross margins ran from 4% to 12%, and concentrating their 
efforts on structural and sheet production, whose margins were usually above 
20%.52
In 1986, with David Aycock newly elected as president and COO to share 
the burden of leadership with Iverson, Nucor began growth in new directions.  In 
a risky move that committed a large portion of their assets, it announced the 
decision to invest in thin-slab casting, a form of technology developed by the 
German company SMS Comcast.  The proposed timeline projected a new mill 
becoming fully operation within three years.  Within a few months, Nucor also 
announced a joint venture with Yamato Kogyo of Japan.  In September, the firm 
entered the import-dominated steel fastener business, and in December Nucor 
purchased a bearing manufacturing facility, the first major manufacturing concern 
to be bought, instead of built.   At the same time, the price of No. 1 heavy melting 
steel scrap hit a low of $74.17 a ton, setting the stage for profitable production. 
Thin-slab Casting at Crawfordsville 
1986 was a critical threshold for Nucor.  The company was shifting into a 
producer for the external market, using only 1/3 of its steel for internal sourcing 
(mostly to the Vulcraft divisions).53  At the same time, its product market had 
nearly reached saturation, thanks to the heavy expansion of the minimills in the 
late ‘70s and the subsequent decline in demand in steel-intensive industries.  
Geographic expansion had led to greater competition and lower margins 
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between minimills, but expansion into product segments outside of rod, bar, and 
small structural shapes had been relatively limited.  Minimills were 16% of the 
nation’s steel capacity in 1986, but their avenues for growth were limited without 
product diversification.  The flat-rolled, higher-margin products had become the 
bastion of integrated steel producers, making up 82% of their total shipments in 
1980 (sheet metal alone was 75%).54  In 1986, no minimill had the technical 
ability or means to compete, although several had examined thin-slab casting 
with the hopes of entering the sheet market.   
Thin-slab casting was an emerging science.  In 1986, several different 
methods were being developed, most of which combined the benefits of 
continuous casting with direct hot-charging to create flat-rolled steel with less 
capital and lower costs.55  In terms of strategic fit, the move into thin-slab casting 
was an example of Nucor’s willingness to quickly invest in new technologies that 
could provide it with a cost advantage.  At the same time, it demonstrated 
management’s desire to expand the company into new markets: As other 
minimills eroded Nucor’s cost advantages in the existing segments, industry 
trends showed customers turning to imports due to their wider range of products 
and better marketing services.   Product differentiation was determined 
necessary for continued growth.   
Nucor estimated that thin-slab casting would allow it to enter the sheet 
metal industry, at 65% volume and 25% gross margins the largest and most 
profitable of the steel segments, with a $50-$75 per ton cost advantage.56   This 
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cost advantage was generated by the reduction in capital expenditures, labor 
(from integrated mills’ requirements of 50 to 60 workers per shift down to 12 for 
the same amount of output) 57 and energy (0.6 million BTUs per ton, as opposed 
to 2.0 million for many other facilities) resulting from the elimination of the 
machinery used to roll thick-cast slabs into thinner sheets, the method used in 
integrated mills.58  Sheet metal served the automotive market, which had grown 
over the 20th century into the largest industrial consumer of steel.  It was Nucor’s 
second largest source of sales, at 15%.  Construction, which used steel all 
across the product spectrum (rebar to sheet) was the largest at 60%.59  In 1986 
the average price for flat-rolled steel was $400 a ton, as compared to $250 per 
ton in the bar market. 60
Nucor was not the first to consider this investment.  The technology had 
existed in the early ‘80s, but been dismissed as a commercial impossibility; one 
version using Hazelett casters was proving already proving expensive and 
difficult to implement in the plants where it had been piloted, including Nucor’s 
own plant in Darlington, SC.61  Nucor had in fact been trying to create its own 
process, but had also been monitoring SMS’ progress carefully since 1984.  
When the German firm announced a successful prototype based on CSP 
(Compact Strip Production) on a scale of production roughly one-tenth that of a 
small minimill in 1985, Nucor executives flew over to investigate.  Finding the 
process viable, they signed a deal to license the technology within a year.     
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The decision process was an impressive example of Nucor’s ability to 
swiftly make large commitments of resources despite having a decentralized 
management structure, as well as their willingness to invest in risky new 
technology.  Despite the fact that hundreds of other managers and engineers 
also examined the SMS plant, no other firms chose to buy the CSP process;62 in 
fact, the German firm was so eager to gain orders that it offered Nucor a money-
back guarantee in case the equipment failed.  The reluctance to buy was 
understandable, as the cost of the investment was very large and the risks high: 
the plant construction costs alone were $270 million, and at some points in the 
process as much was 25% of Nucor’s total assets (and if working capital 
requirements were included, close to their entire net worth) would be tied up in 
the project.63  Furthermore, the small scale of the model plant made it difficult to 
predict the problems that would arise with processing a larger batch.  However, 
being first to sign the license agreement secured Nucor a cost reduction of 
several million, and allowed them to bargain for performance clauses.64
The timeline they set for themselves was also daunting: two years to bring 
the continuous casters online, and another half year to begin hot rolling, meaning 
that the plant in Crawfordsville would be fully operational by April of 1989.  This 
was typical of Nucor construction speeds and reduced the cost of capital for their 
projects, but had never been attempted with a new, untested technology.  Start-
up costs were an educated guess at best.  Integrated steelmakers were confident 
that the installation would be more difficult than anticipated, or that the steel 
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produced would never meet standards at the upper end of the market.  
Externally, failure was not a consideration; internally, the Corporate Controller 
admitted that, “Thin-slab was a big gamble…It would have been a serious wound 
had it not worked.”65
As it turned out, the gamble paid off with impressive results.  In August of 
1989, the plant began operations.  After some initial adjustments were made, the 
plant was able to produce high-quality thin sheets that could be used to make 
automotive parts.  Within two years of operation, it was profitably producing 
700,000 tons of steel; within four, it was being expanded to a capacity of 2.1 
million tons per year.  Other minimills began to adopt the process slowly 
throughout the ‘90s, after thin-slab had proven to be one of the “two biggest 
leaps in steelmaking productivity in the twentieth century,” reducing man-hours 
per ton to less than one, and improving production speed to less than four hours 
required to turn scrap into finished coil.66
Capitalizing on their skill in rapid construction and head start on the 
learning curve, Nucor quickly expanded its Sheet Mill Group.  Nucor announced 
plans in October 1990 to construct a new mill that would produce hot-rolled sheet 
steel in Mississippi County, Arkansas, using the same technology that was 
successfully proven at the Crawfordsville, Indiana plant. Construction started on 
the plant in February 1991, and operations started in 1992.67  Before 1996, two 
more mills were built in Arkansas and South Carolina.  By 1996, both mills had 
been expanded to double their original capacity, or 4 million tons per year each; 
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the 1.8 million tons from the South Carolina mill then in construction would make 
Nucor the second-largest steel producer in the US.   All three plants produced 
high-grade sheet steel that was adjustable-width and could be cold-rolled or 
galvanized for further processing; this customizability resulted in strong demand 
from automotive, construction, and appliance manufacturers. 68
Nucor’s minimill competitors, lacking such nimble management and a 
high-quality labor force able to take on the complicated tasks and greater 
responsibility necessitated by the reduced number of men per heat in thin-slab 
casting, were unable to imitate these investments for several years, by which 
time Nucor had already established a strong market share.  In 1997, five other 
minimills in America were attempting to follow Nucor’s lead using the SMS 
technology or one of the six competing thin-slab systems that sprung up in its 
wake; their total capacity was roughly 8.6 million tons per year, less than Nucor’s 
9.8 million (including the South Carolina plant).  
Another investment, similar in structure and principle if not in scale, was 
made in 1991, when Nucor signed an agreement with Gradic Wire AB of 
Sweden, making it the first North American producer to use the patented G-
casting technique to directly cast wire.69  Like thin-slab, G-casting was 
completely revolutionary, required far less capital (the Nucor Wire mill, at one-
tenth the size of Nucor’s other facilities, was called a “midget mill”) and was 
several times faster than traditional techniques for wire casting.  The stainless 
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steel wire produced was also thinner than that which could be achieved by older 
methods. 
Joint Ventures, Acquisitions, and Internal Growth 
 Thin-slab was not Nucor’s only investment in technology in 1986, although 
it was the largest.  Nucor also signed a letter of intent with Yamato Kogyo 
detailing a joint venture between the two companies to produce wide-flange 
beams (I-beams) with a depth of 24 inches.  Similar to their approach to thin-
slab, Nucor showed a willingness to invest in efficiency and execution.  Again, 
this was a higher gross-margin (18%), major market (24% of total steel 
demand)70 product that was being solely by integrated mills, and only the three 
largest (Bethlehem, US and Inland) at that.  (Chaparral, a competing minimill, 
produced wide-flange beams of a more limited depth.)71
Nucor, with no R&D department (one reason why it rarely invented new 
processes), needed Yamato’s technical expertise to complete the structural 
beam blank casting process, providing the melting and materials-handling 
technologies in exchange.  John Correnti, who had supervised Nucor’s Utah 
minimill during its startup, was placed in charge of the project.  The plant’s cost 
was estimated to be $200 million, and time to completion, despite the incredulity 
of the Japanese partners, was set at 18 months, an impressively short time for 
what would in the three years be the world’s largest structural steel mill.  
Construction began in 1987; in September of 1988, the plant shipped its first 
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beam.  Within a year it had exceeded its originally planned capacity.  In 1996 it 
was producing 2.3 million tons per year.72     
Not all Nucor’s technological investments focused on innovation; the 
decision to enter the fastener market was based primarily on the belief that Nucor 
could produce efficiently enough to match import prices.  At the time, imports 
supplied almost 90% of the market, but using a largely automated, state-of-the-
art facility (initially built at a cost of $25 million and upgraded in the early ‘90s), 
Nucor was able to make, and to a certain extent, customize various bolts, nuts 
and screws at a competitive price, internally sourcing its raw material from the 
Bar Mill Group.  The products served a wide variety of industries, ranging from 
automotive to farm implements.  The plant capacity was originally 40,000 tons 
per year; the upgrade and expansion brought it to 75,000.       
Nucor’s last entry into a new line of business for 1986 was an outright 
acquisition.  In December, the company purchased a manufacturing outfit from 
General Bearing Corporation, which evolved into the Bearing Product Division 
and then Nucor Bearing Products, Inc.  The Division was unusual for two 
reasons: it had been bought, not built, and it was externally sourced.  Up until the 
late ‘90s, Nucor was not capable of producing the kind of steel needed to make 
bearings, but it continued to build and sell over a hundred million small parts 
annually using outside steel.  There was no particular cost advantage to 
producing the bearings and the division never played a significant part in Nucor’s 
bottom line.  The acquisition seems to have been purely an effort to broaden 
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Nucor’s product offering, continue its process of providing customization and 
possibly to diversify its markets.  (The division’s products were used in GM, 
Chrysler and Ford cars, as well as a number of other products with moving parts, 
such as lawn mowers.73)  The bearings plant did not capitalize on Nucor’s core 
competencies or strengthen the activity system, and Nucor never sought to 
expand it in later years.   
Nucor was more successful in its entrance into the building products 
industry.  If by 1988 there were any doubts that minimills could effectively 
compete in the highly processed, customized product end of the steel industry, 
they were eliminated when Nucor began operations at its first Building Systems 
plant in Indiana.  The new division offered custom-built metal buildings and 
building components to contractors for industrial, commercial, and institutional 
buildings; the metal for the buildings was largely sourced from Nucor’s Bar and 
Sheet Mill Groups.  Construction frequently involved other materials and 
services, which Nucor subcontracted to a third party.  The buildings were sold 
through a builder distribution network, which allowed better matches of supply 
and demand and cut lead-time.  The convenience of this system led to a higher 
willingness-to-pay for its customers, and the growth of profits convinced the 
company to build a second branch in 1995, eventually adding a third.  The 
combined capacity of the three facilities exceeded 140,000 tons per year.  Their 
distinct cost advantage came from being able to internally source most raw 
materials from Nucor’s own minimills. 
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Other Expansions 
Throughout the early ‘90s Nucor continued to expand its existing 
operations, including the Nucor-Yamato plant in Arkansas.  At the same time, it 
shed its remaining non-steel business, a chemical research concern, at a 
significant gain.  In 1991, Aycock stepped down as president, and was 
succeeded by Correnti.  The same year, Nucor moved its corporate headquarters 
into a larger, more stylish office space, perhaps in recognition of their new status 
as one of America’s leading steel producers.   Profits in 1993 were $2.25 billion, 
roughly a hundred times what they had been a decade before.  Despite an 
overall industry slump, all divisions remained profitable, and Nucor continued to 
add to and expand its mills, particularly in the newer groups.  This capacity 
expansion raised entry barriers for other minimills: by committing to new plants, 
which were sticky production factors, Nucor made it less profitable for its 
competitors to expand.   
Nucor’s last venture of the early ‘90s was to begin production of iron 
carbide in Trinidad, hoping to reduce its dependency on scrap.  However, this 
time the revolutionary nature of both the technology and the location served to 
foil efforts at profitable production, and the plant did not reach profitability for 
several years.  As Iverson often said, Nucor’s managers were not infallible, and 
their ability to take risks naturally resulted in the occasional loss or failure.  
However, the tight emphasis on profitability ensured that mistakes were seldom 
repeated, and risks were generally only taken when the potential gains made 
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them worthwhile.  In the case of iron carbide, Nucor’s increasing exposure to 
rising scrap prices (exacerbated by the new sheet mills) made management 
eager to look for alternative sources of supply, a goal they retained even after the 
iron carbide project had been abandoned.   
Positioning in Steel Products 
 In this period of development, Nucor invested heavily in various 
expansions of its product line.  The key to being able to expand into higher 
margin segments was the development of thin-slab casting, as almost all such 
segments demanded sheet or strip metal (total demand for these products  
Figure 5.  Nucor Competitive Positioning:  Steel products 
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comprised 49.7% of total steel demand in 1996)74, as opposed to bar or rebar.  
Prior to 1986, this had been one of the last of the product categories still wholly 
dominated by the integrated steel makers, as the cost of the casters and 
reducers used in the integrated process had been prohibitive for minimills.   
 As a result of thin-slab and concerted effort at diversification that pushed 
into horizontal (sheet, wire, fasteners, I-beams) and vertical (iron carbide, 
bearings, building systems) integration, Nucor’s positioning expanded to overlap 
and encompass that of the integrated mills.     
Coasting and Thickening around the Activity System (Appendix E) 
 In this period Nucor did precisely what it had been doing all along.  
Despite its attempt to move into higher-margin markets, it did not compromise its 
strategic fit: It maintained its decentralized structure, giving new plants autonomy 
as they were built.  It invested heavily in new technologies that allowed it to 
operate more productively with far less capital than integrated steelmakers, and 
showed itself to be quick to respond to new opportunities and threats, willing to 
take risks and capable of long-term commitment.  Not surprisingly, this resulted 
in constant profitability, an achievement that becomes more impressive in light of 
the rate of growth Nucor was able to sustain for a decade: from 1988 to 1994, 
Nucor accounted for more than 80 percent of the industry’s growth in 
shipments.75   
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Nucor’s tight fit drove its successful expansion.  It paid close attention to 
developing technology both at home and abroad, and had a management 
structure and team willing to take risks by investing in such technology.  The lack 
of bureaucracy in the company allowed for speedy decision-making, while a 
competent, independent workforce ensured smooth implementation and 
operation once decisions had been made.    Finally, the efficiency of the 
operation led to higher quality and lower costs, reinforcing their competitive 
advantage and increasing the amount of value they were able to appropriate.  
Without these well-fitting activities, Nucor could not have sustained a rapid rate of 
development to profitably outpace its competitors.  Nucor’s leader, Iverson, was 
well aware that the company’s strengths lay in the construction and operation of 
steel products plants and continued to leverage these skills, while divesting the 
company’s final non-steel related assets. 
Although Nucor’s decisions to invest in technology were critical to its 
growth strategy, Nucor’s managers did not neglect their people.  At the same 
time as the company relied on the strength of its workforce to operate its new 
plants, it reinforced excellent labor relations by sharing profits and improving its 
plant safety.  In 1987, Nucor's injury/illness rate for its steelmaking operations 
was 17.33 cases per 100 workers. That number peaked at 24.76 in 1989. After 
Nucor instituted the measure of keeping a safety coordinator at every plant, it fell 
steadily, dropping to 13.62 in 1992 and down to 8.81 through October of 1996.76  
The fatality rate also fell. According to the company, it has not had a fatality at its 
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steelmaking operations since 1991, when two workers died. Five workers have 
died since 1987, with one death in 1988, another in 1989 and a third in 1990.77 
When the press (possibly due to union lobbying) drew attention to safety 
concerns the company responded immediately; its efforts won it a Certificate of 
Merit from Wausau Insurance Companies in 1995. 
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CHAPTER 9 
AN ERA OF GROWTH AND COMPETITION: 1996-2006 
 
Historical Overview 
Nucor experienced changes in leadership as Iverson turned over his CEO 
duties to company veteran and heir apparent John Correnti in 1996. Nucor's 
expansion focus continued under this new leadership. Under Correnti, Nucor built 
a steel beam mill in South Carolina, added a galvanizing facility as well as its first 
steel plate mill, which became operational in 2000. 78
Foreign imports put downward pressure on prices as imports entered the 
market in large numbers. The company slashed prices twice in 1998 to compete 
against imports from Russia, Japan, and Brazil. Both sales and earnings declined 
that year due to low metal prices, reduced shipments, and start-up costs for new 
plants. In an effort to regain price integrity, the company raised its prices in 1999. 
1999 was also a year of boardroom musical chairs as Nucor's leadership 
changed yet again.  Correnti resigned amidst disagreement with the board, and 
chairman David Aycock assumed his duties. In September of 2000 Aycock 
resigned from the company and Daniel R. DiMicco, an EVP, became CEO of 
Nucor.79
From the very beginning, Dimicco confessed to an international focus and 
continued with the wave of expansion that was set in motion before him.  Under 
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DiMicco, Nucor cast its reach oversea.  Early in 2000, Nucor, along with 
Australia's Broken Hill Proprietary Corporation and Japan's Ishikawajima-Harima 
Heavy Industries, began a joint venture called Castrip, LLC for strip casting. Strip 
casting allowed steel makers to produce in smaller, cheaper plants. In March 
2001 Nucor purchased a significant amount of assets of Auburn Steel, a 
producer of merchant steel bar. Within the United States, Nucor purchased 
Alabama-based Trico Steel, a steel sheet producer, for approximately $116 
million.80 In late 2002 Nucor bought financially troubled Birmingham Steel for 
$615 million in cash and debt. Backward integration also continued for Nucor into 
this period because of the rise in steel input costs.  Nucor teamed up with 
Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD), a Brazilian producer and exporter of iron-
ore pellets, to develop low-cost iron based products in an effort to replace its 
dependency on steel scrap suppliers.  
 Nucor also changed its traditionally anti-protectionist position in 2001.  In 
a significant turnaround, Nucor lobbied with fellow steel maker for Bush’s 
Proposition 201, which ultimately imposed a 30% tariff on steel import.81 
Unfortunately, government intervention was unable to significantly boost to 
Nucor’s bottom line because of high cost of expansion.  Nucor's results were hurt 
by a 50% rise in start-up costs. On the positive side, Revenue rose 31% to $1.53 
billion as acquisitions of new steel-producing assets boosted total steel 
shipped.82    
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Steel Industry Environment: Porter’s Five Forces 
Degree of Rivalry.  In many ways, steel makers’ profits are determined by their 
ability to contend with the cyclicality of steel demand.  The soft economy, 
reduced construction demand, and foreign influx of steel products all could and 
did contributed to downward pressure on steel price in 1996-2005. When firms 
compete fiercely for customers, who demanded lower prices, the degree to 
rivalry escalated.  Foreign competition was an important factor.  For instance, 
increased imports resulted in lower prices by $30/ton for minimills in 2000.83 This 
situation was assuaged to an extent by the President’s import tariff and a weak 
dollar in 2002-2003.84 However, with Bush’s abolishing the tariff in December of 
2003, the degree of rivalry increased and the threat of a price war returned to a 
heightened level.  
Despite the public attention on foreign competition, imports were not the 
only driver for the high degree of rivalry.  According to Dimicco, “Imports certainly 
have a major impact, causing 30 or 40 percent [of the problem]. The other 60 
percent is self-inflicted.”85  Triggered by foreign competitors, US steel makers 
engaged in price wars and gave away value to the customers unnecessarily.  
Moreover, steel industry continues to be plagued by excess capacity due largely 
to increasing number of minimills in the US.  When combined with the growth of 
imports and a sluggish economy, the degree of rivalry escalated.   
Recognizing the need to reduce the degree of rivalry, steel makers have 
begun to consolidate amidst bankruptcy and acquisitions.  Nucor acquired the 
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bankrupted Birmingham Steel in 2002, bringing its total US minimill count to 14 
mills.86 The company also considers deeper global expansion.  These trends 
reduce the degree of rivalry as firms recognize their interdependence and 
restrain their rivalry.87  This spirit of restraint and cooperation was already 
apparent as large players lobbied together actively for the 30% tariff.   
Barriers to Entry.  There were already a significant number of players in the steel 
industry to make it an extremely competitive market. Moreover, the cost of 
building a plant has steadily decreased and the cost of entry has been lowered 
as a consequence.   To make the matters worse, Nucor’s minimill technology is 
highly transferable.  According to David Stickler, a steel- industry investment 
banker: ``All you need is iron, cheap electricity, and 300 workers''.88  The 
reduced initial investment became an opportunity for other manufacturers to 
enter the market. 
Ironically, Nucor’s market success has demonstrated the potential 
profitability for the steel industry and reduced the barrier to entry by pioneering a 
disruptive technology.  More importantly, the buyers’ willingness to switch 
encouraged the expansion of minimills in this period.  As a case in point, Keith 
Busse, the former Nucor executive, started Steel Dynamic, Inc in 1996.89  SDI 
managed to start a plant at a low start-up cost of 600 million and followed a 
similar expansionary path as Nucor.   The Nucor model worked well for the SDI, 
which recently outbid Nucor for the minimill Qualitech Steel.90  SDI’s success 
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demonstrated the lowered barrier to entry, and Nucor could easily trace this 
development back to its own success.  
Supplier Power.  Nucor’s relationship with the scrap-metal suppliers mirrored its 
downstream relationship with the steel buyers.  Because of the competitive profit 
margin and the commodity nature of scrap, supplier power is usually low when 
the prices of steel are low.   As a supplier described: “(Cost cutting nature of the 
industry) drives pricing lower and lower to a point where there's no money left for 
research and development...It's very difficult to counteract".91  Nucor’s source of 
power stems from large number of suppliers as well as low switching cost of 
changing suppliers.  According to Dan DiMicco, "You'd be remiss to your 
shareholders and employees if you did not work to get the best price. Once the 
suppliers have won the contract, then how well you work together to bring that 
project to completion, that's where the partnership is. Up until that point, they're 
competing against five or six other guys, and we're competing against 20 
different steel companies for the product we're going to be producing."92
 In 2005, supplier power has been boosted by the increased demand for 
scraps of global market. In particular, Asian steel makers bought scrap metal to 
feed the expansion in Asia.  Specifically, Nucor experienced a sharp increase in 
input cost as China’s demand for raw material shot up due to its heightened 
construction activity.93  It is partially because of this increase in supplier power 
that Nucor saw its profits drop by 59% in 2003.94   
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Buyer Power.  On the demand side, minimal product differentiation and low 
switching cost allow buyers to switch between steel producers with ease.  The 
proliferation of minimills and high amount of imports of recent years meant there 
are increasing numbers of steel producers for steel buyers to choose from.  As a 
result, buyer power in the steel industry is extremely high.  
Strategic Positioning of Competitors 
As minimills’ operational expertise disseminated throughout the industry, 
operational efficiency increased across the board and the gradual competitive 
convergence intensified.  In basic steel production, one can observe the Red 
Queen effect as both the integrated steel makers and minimills, such as Nucor 
and SDI, consolidated in order to increase operation efficiency and lower 
production cost.  Fortunately, Nucor has simultaneously expanded into higher 
margin, more complex product lines to avoid competing on similar competitive 
competencies.  As of 2003, Nucor’s main product lines include: carbon and alloy 
steel bars, beam, sheet, plates, cold finished steel, steel joists and joists girders, 
steel deck, metal building systems, light gauge steel framing.95  
  As a result of this broadening of product focus (See Figure 6), Nucor’s 
overall position moves up and to the right in the strategic positioning chart into a 
cost leadership focus.96 Interestingly, integrated steel makers took the opposite 
track and trimmed their product lines to retain only the most profitable operations 
- narrowing to a cost base focus in order to achieve solvency for many troubled 
operations.  This resulted in moving up (higher margin product) and to the left 
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(reduction of product breadth) for the integrated steel makers.  Overall, Nucor 
faces leaner and meaner competitors in the domestic market from the traditional 
steel makers. Minimills such as SDI have increased the level of competition by 
closely following Nucor’s expansion model. This is apparent in minimills’ 
proximity to Nucor on the strategic positioning graph as well as other minimills’ 
acquisition activities. 
Nucor’s ability to broaden its product line profitably is due to the high 
quality of its labor resources.  The high production discipline of its labor 
resources can be utilized across different product lines of steel making. For 
instance, Nucor transfers its managers across different product lines to capitalize 
on their expertise.  Therefore, Nucor is able to occupy the position of broad 
product breadth, a space originally occupied by integrated steel makers, more 
successfully than the traditional steel makers.  In short, Nucor’s superior 
resource and stronger industry position potentially allow it to operate more 
profitably than traditional steel makers in the wide product scope position.   
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 Figure 6. 2006 Strategic Positioning of Steel Industry 
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Activity System: Thickening & Coasting around Core Elements (Appendix F) 
   Nucor chose not to engage in significant trimming of its activity system in 
1996-2006.  Instead, Nucor’s activity system demonstrated thickening around the 
original core elements of low cost structure, strong labor relation, technology 
focus, specialized product, and focus on high margin products through a set of 
new activities.  Overall, Nucor has consolidated its position in the steel industry 
through elaboration of previously created core elements.  This reinforcement of 
complementary activities is especially important during this period since Nucor’s 
competitors, such as SDI, have copied Nucor’s operating model with a high 
degree of success.  Indeed, Nucor has not only expanded activity around the 
core elements of low cost and technology focus to improve operation efficiency, 
but also remained committed to its main factor of strong labor management as a 
key source of its competitive advantage. 
Domestic and International Expansion 
 Reinforcing the notion of Low Cost Structure and Strong Labor Relation 
For Nucor, increasing capacity strengthened the firm’s operational 
efficiency and lower production cost through economy of scale and learning 
experiences.  Besides increased operation efficiency, international expansions 
into Latin America also translated into lower labor cost and government 
subsidies, which reinforced the low cost core element.  During this period, Nucor 
also expanded domestically through the purchase of Birmingham steel and 
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through the potential addition of micro-mills, a form of strip casting mills even 
smaller than those of regular minimills.   
On the supply side, Nucor backward-integrated abroad by building raw 
material processing in an effort to reduce input costs.  As Nucor moved more 
aggressively into flat-rolled steel, its need for higher-quality scraps increased.97  
Since January 1993, prices of low-residual scraps have jumped from $15 to $20 
a ton higher than regular grades of scrap.98  In response, Nucor teamed up with 
Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD), a Brazilian producer and exporter of iron-
ore pellets, to develop low-cost iron based products to reduce its dependency on 
scrap.  
Nucor continued to thicken its element of strong labor quality through its 
international expansion. When considering expansion into Latin America, Nucor 
was drawn by the hard working nature of the South American workers.   Nucor 
also elaborated around its core element of strong labor management practice by 
strengthening its sophisticated knowledge management system through the 
transfer of key managers.  At its new plate plants in the US, executives with 
years of steel making experience worked to transfer steel-making know-how to 
new ventures.  When hiring for its first plate mill in North Carolina, Nucor took 
care to choose experienced steel workers from its own plants along with outside 
workers.99  This practice of utilizing the company’s reservoir of experience 
reduced the overall start up costs for Nucor and complemented the low cost 
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structure by reducing startup costs.  Nucor also continued to coast along its 
highly competitive hiring process; the management chose only 190 out of the 
5400 workers who applied for positions.100  This consistency in maintaining 
Nucor’s exceptional people factor allowed the company to sustain its competitive 
advantage by reinforcing key elements of its activity systems.  However, the 
company also began to hire outside management, rather than promoting 
experienced workers into the boardroom, one of the issues which was a source 
of strife between Iverson and Aycock.   
Nucor also reinforced its element of higher quality for its customers 
through its expansion.  This strong customer focus added to the uniqueness of 
Nucor’s activity system and builds relationship with key customers.  For example, 
Nucor’s expansion into strip casting micro-mills allowed it to locate closer to 
customers’ base of operation, which meant transportation cost savings of up to 
$20/ton for key customers.101  Overall, Nucor’s international growth focus 
reflected a growing willingness to meet customers’ needs.  Many manufacturers 
had emphasized that they wanted their Chinese plants to be supplied by mills in 
Asia.102 "If U.S. companies want a piece of the action, they won't be able to do it 
from a U.S. base".103  Thus, through better services and extra cost savings, 
Nucor effectively increases switching cost for its core customers, who would 
have to forfeit Nucor’s reliability and superior logistics cost if they decide to 
switch to one of Nucor’s many competitors. 
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Continual Focus on Technology 
 Kenneth Iverson said it best when he commented on Nucor’s success 
factors: “70% of it has to do with culture and 30% has to do with technology”.104  
Nucor has always been an innovator with technology.  Strip casting technology, 
which casts molten steel directly into thin sheets, allows steelmakers to switch 
among multiple steel grades quickly.105  By thickening around the element of 
technology focus with strip casting technology, Nucor reinforced technology’s 
complementarities to the core element of low cost.  Indeed, strip casting only 
requires around 10% of a new integrated mill’s capital investment but will turn out 
steel 20 times as fast.106  Even more encouraging is the fact that micro-mill 
technology can produce cold-rolled sheet for $200/ton, which costs $300-310/ton 
to make today.107
Besides reinforcing its low cost structure, investment in technology allows 
Nucor to thicken around the core element of high quality.  Nucor installed 
Parsytec automatic surface-detection systems in its plants; Parsytec scans steel 
for cracks.108  By harnessing technology to assure better quality, Nucor created 
value by fulfilling customers’ needs for reliable products and complements its 
customer focus element.  
Broadening into Specialized Product Lines: Complementing Customer Focus 
 
One of Nucor’s specialized product lines is new plate production.  
Responding to customer needs, Nucor began to produce a series of basic plate 
grades and moved up the value chain by expanding into different ranges of better 
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quality plates.  This thickening around specialized product lines diversifies the 
company’s products and stabilizes cash flow when the prices of basic steel 
products drop in response to macroeconomic pressures.  In addition, this 
specialization into higher margin product has improved Nucor’s profitability and 
reinforced the customer focus by fulfilling the needs for high quality steel product. 
Commitment and Evolution towards a Better Fit 
 By consistently thickening around its core elements, Nucor has evolved 
toward a strong strategic fit through a unique and consistent activity system.   
One element that Nucor has taken care to cultivate is its strong worker 
relationships.  As a sticky factor, this worker relation was durable, specialized, 
and scarce.  By providing generous compensation, Nucor’s workers remain loyal 
to the company.  Furthermore, Nucor has invested continuously in a work force 
that possessed specialized steel making knowledge  - a work force that could be 
transferred amongst steel making operations.  This flexibility allowed Nucor to 
transfer the expertise of its workers across different product lines, which 
translated into lower startup costs for Nucor as a whole.  It will be difficult for 
competitors to access or imitate Nucor’s labor relations in a short time.  By 
committing to this sticky factor of strong labor relations on a continuous basis, 
Nucor has a strong chance of sustaining its competitive advantage into the 
future.    
Another key feature of Nucor’s activity system is the complementarities 
amongst its elements.  A strong technology focus reinforces low cost structure 
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and higher quality products.  The core element of high quality is also 
complementary with a strong customer focus.  Nucor is able to retain key 
customers by providing superior quality products.  
Value Creation  
High Incentive for Supplier (See Figure 7) 
Nucor’s strategy of high incentive structure reduces the suppliers’ 
opportunity cost for doing business with Nucor.  By maintaining good supplier 
relationships and offering bonuses for timely delivery, Nucor is able to open its 
plants at lower cost and create higher value for itself.  Suppliers are installing 
equipment that allows them to better integrate with Nucor.109  This superior 
coordination reduces probability of plant failures, lowers cost, and creates value.   
Appropriating Value from Suppliers 
Backward Integration through iron pellet production 
 
With the rising cost for scrap metal, Nucor attempts to stabilize its cost lines 
through the process of backward integration into iron pellet production.  By 
gradually reducing its dependence on suppliers, Nucor is appropriating value 
away from the scrap producers. 
Creating Value for Customers 
New Steel Technology for Higher Quality 
 Nucor’s focus on new technology such as Parsytec automatic surface-detection 
system produces superior quality steel and increase customer’s willingness to 
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pay.  Furthermore, the strip-cast technology allows the plant to be located close 
to the customer.  This in turn allows customers to cut costs and increase their 
willingness to pay for the firm’s products.  
 
Figure 7 Nucor Value Creation and Appropriation 
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSIONS 
Nucor’s story is one of growth towards a strategic fit against the 
competitive backdrop of the ultimate commodity market.  Over the years and 
largely through the vision of one man, Nucor has evolved towards a strong 
strategic fit with a consistent activity system.  By strengthening around its core 
elements in its activity system, the company has shown a strong commitment to 
its strategy.   Even though competitors might attempt to imitate Nucor’s 
management system, the mini mill’s main sticky factor of an extraordinarily strong 
worker relations as well as the complex host of interrelated activities made the 
firm’s success difficult to replicate.  Thus, despite economic swings and tough 
competition, Nucor continues to grow steadily. 
  There are three main takeaways from the Nucor story that can apply to 
any industry: 
 
(1) Advantages of intangible sticky factors:  Management theory has 
described the importance of developing organizational sticky factors in 
building sustainable advantages in business.110  While much attention in 
the subject is focused on tangible sticky factors, such as capital 
expenditures, Nucor serves as an example of how intangible sticky factors 
can provide even greater benefits.  Integrated mills are one of the greatest 
examples of commitment in modern times, requiring massive capital 
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expenditures to build and operate.  As theory would predict, such signals 
of commitment preserved an oligopoly in the steel industry for many 
decades.  However, commitment to such a large tangible sticky factor has 
a downside.  When technology advanced in the 1960s, the trade-off 
between commitment and flexibility became readily apparent.  The same 
sticky factor that had been such a great source of commitment and 
sustained advantage became a primary reason that integrated mills did 
not experiment with the disruptive minimill technology, a decision that 
eventually led to their downfall.   
Meanwhile, Nucor’s greatest sticky factor was intangible: 
extraordinary labor management practices.  This was a key factor in their 
rapid, successful growth, and in their ability to produce steel at margins 
that could compete with imports.  Intangible sticky factors share or exceed 
the inimitability of tangible sticky factors in commitment, while being more 
inherently flexible than the tangible commitments made by integrated 
mills.  Nucor has shown in joint-ventures and in the unusually rapid 
adoption of new technologies that its labor practices can be applied in a 
variety of steel applications.  This makes Nucor less likely to be caught in 
the trap of the integrated mills, should a successor to minimill technology 
arise. 
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Every organization should seek to identify and develop intangible 
sticky factors that can both add value to present operations, and increase 
the flexibility of the organization to adapt to a changing environment. 
 
(2) Dependence vs. continuity:  As the future of Nucor unfolds, it may prove to 
be a cautionary tale of the tradeoff between dependence and continuity.  
The low-level responsibility in the Nucor organization did produce superior 
results, but such a model of autonomy within a defined framework relies 
heavily on aligned visions of managers at all levels.  The charismatic 
leadership of Ken Iverson accomplished this purpose during Nucor’s rapid 
growth, but Nucor has yet to prove that his successors can do the same.  
After 30 years of a profitability focus, the company’s newfound capacity 
focus may provide managers with the wrong incentives for Nucor’s long-
term health.  The next decade will likely be a telling one for Nucor. 
Regardless of whether or not Iverson’s replacement is ultimately 
successful, the company’s difficulty in replacing him illustrates the 
problematic conflict between dependence and continuity.  Since Iverson’s 
retirement eight years ago, there have been three CEOs.  If a leader has a 
successful vision, as Iverson did, an organization dependent on that one 
person can achieve outstanding results.  However, every great leader will 
eventually leave, and there is no guarantee that a carefully selected 
successor can achieve the same results.  A potential way to smooth this 
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transition is to clearly and credibly inculcate the leader’s vision into the 
firm’s internal structure and governance.  Otherwise, best practices may 
prove to be transient and limited to the leader’s tenure.     
 
(3) Controlled growth:  Even in a rapidly growing firm, it is important to control 
the pace and direction of that growth.  Profitability consistently remained 
the core consideration in new project evaluations. Nucor carefully 
monitored growth during its expansion period, selecting only projects 
where its sticky factors could be successfully leveraged.  
An equally important aspect to growth management applies to the 
point when a company begins to reach maturity.  Rate of growth will 
inevitably slow.  The absolute scale implications of a fixed growth rate are 
radically different for a $500 million company and a $4 billion company.  
While every executive would readily admit that 25% annual growth cannot 
be indefinite, many companies are reluctant to accept that fact when the 
time comes.  Nucor is at this stage now, and may be making this exact 
mistake.  This would explain why a company that used to reject with 
disdain the idea of “growth for the sake of growth” would adopt a policy of 
rapidly increasing its capacity through acquisitions.  Moving forward, 
Nucor must examine its current growth projects, as must every company, 
and determine whether growth plans are due to the sufficient presence of 
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profitable, applicable project opportunities, or whether projects are being 
taken on simply to meet growth expectations based on prior growth rates. 
 To maintain its lucrative stance within an increasingly competitive 
industry, the firm needs to learn from and continue its evolution towards fit.  
It has surpassed the expectations of the industry and its investors before, 
and it is a widely held belief that it possesses the potential to do so again.    
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